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BEYOND FURMAN V. GEORGIA: THE NEED FOR A MORALLY
BASED DECISION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
L. S. Tao*
I. Introduction
Only three years after Furman v. Georgia,' the constitutionality of the death
penalty is again before the Supreme Court. Several reasons explain this renewed
attack on capital punishment. On constitutional doctrine, the Court settled very
little in Furman. It condemned the capricious and discriminatory application of
capital punishment and the two justices who favored total elimination of the
penalty also shared the view that its application had been capricious.2 It can be
argued, therefore, that the majority in Furman held that capital punishment,
applied under the discretion of judges or juries, was unconstitutional. This
condemnation on the discriminatory nature of execution, however, left the core
issue of its constitutionality unresolved and, ironically, had the effect of providing
a justification for imposition of nondiscriminatory sentences. By the end of 1975,
29 states had reinstated capital punishment for specific crimes.
Furman, however, did focus public attention on the constitutionality of
capital punishment. For more than a decade, the penalty had been fading away.
Certainly then, to the dismay of some observers, instead of eliminating capital
punishment altogether, the Supreme Court revived a public debate and generated
a considerable degree of legislative enthusiasm for its continued use. If it had
been hoped by some justices and attorneys that an attack on the capricious
administration of the penalty would cause the various states to abolish capital
punishment, such hope proved unrealistic. The debate now, both within the
courtroom and in the public forum, must be focused on its merits.
This article will reexamine the justifications for capital punishment in the
light of Supreme Court precedent. After a discussion of Furman and the decisions
preceding it, the various propositions for and against retention of the death
penalty will be analyzed. Finally, a tentative prediction will be made on the lines
of judicial thought which may be included in a new decision on this issue.
II. An Analysis of Furman
A. Furman and the Majority Opinions
Three lines of thought have emerged from Furman. The first asserts that
the death penalty is both improper and unjust for a modem, civilized society;'
it is essentially no longer compatible with our sense of fairness and should be
*
Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York, Brockport;
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1 408 U.S. 238 (1971).
2 Id. at 269 (Brennan, J.); id. at 330-32 (Marshall, J.).
3 Id.
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abolished. By focusing attention on the intrinsic value of the penalty, the question
becomes whether or not capital punishment is an appropriate means for dealing
with criminals. The second strain of thought stresses the discriminatory administration of the sentence4 finding the penalty cruel not in its nature but rather in
its capricious application. This argument necessarily raises the question of whether
the penalty has in fact been arbitrarily executed. Rarity in administration presents
one proof; selectiveness in execution among those who have been convicted of
capital offenses becomes another ground. Finally, the third line of thought
expressed in Furmanis that the penalty is no longer useful.5 As a result, its retention must be reexamined. Such an assessment, by the logic of this argument,
has to be made in the light of empirical evidence about its utility. If the utility is
minimal then it would be offset by the costs of execution. These costs include the
possibility of mistake in sentencing a person to death,' the loss of a human life,
deprivation of chances for rehabilitation, and the expenses for the execution. On
the other hand, if capital punishment deters then its utility may be enormously
increased. Whether or not the penalty is worth retaining, then, depends on how
much is known about its deterrent effect. Instead of settling the issue, it raises
a factual question which has evoked endless debate.
It is interesting that the utilitarian argument cuts across the two sides of the
Court. The "moralist" view, which stresses the abhorrent nature of the punishment, and the criticism of its arbitrary application, find support only among the
justices who voted against the statutes challenged in Furman. As will be shown
later, however, these two views may also be used to support the position for retention of capital punishment.
Justices Brennan and Marshall deal directly with the intrinsic value of the
death penalty. Brennan believes that there are four principles "recognized in our
cases and inherent in" the eighth amendment, "sufficient to permit a judicial
determination whether a challenged punishment"7 comports with human dignity
and therefore is not cruel and unusual. The four principles are: (1) "a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings";
(2) the government "must not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment"; (3) "a
severe punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society"; and (4)
"a severe punishment must not be excessive... [or] unnecessary."' On the basis
of these criteria, Justice Brennan concludes that capital punishment "involves,
by its very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity."' As a result, he
"would not hesitate to hold, on that ground alone, that death is today a 'cruel
and unusual punishment,' were it not that death is a punishment of longstanding

4 Id. at 249-57 (Douglas, J.); id. at 309 '(Stewart, J.); id. at 311 (White, J.).

id.

5 Id. at 311-12 (White, J.); id. at 347-53 (Marshall, J.); id. at 395-96 (Burger, C. J.);
at 395-96 (Powell, J.).
6 Charles L. Black stresses the possibility of mistake as a principal reason for his opposition

to the death penalty.
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AND MISTAKE (1974). However, Hugo Bedau has asserted that chances for a mistaken execution have been very small on the basis of his re-examination of 74 cases after 1893. Bedau,
The Death Penalty in America, 35 FEDEmRAL PROBATION 32 '(1971).
7 408 U.S. at 270.
8 Id. at 271, 274, 277, 279.

9 Id. at 290.
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usage and acceptance in this country."' 0
Justice Marshall is less firm than Brennan in opposing the "degrading"
- nature of the penalty. Nevertheless, he finds it abhorrent to currently existing
moral values." "Whether or not a punishment is cruel or unusual depends," he
argues, "not on whether its mere mention 'shocks the conscience and sense of
justice of the people,' but on whether people who were fully informed as to the
purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust
and unacceptable."- On this score Marshall seems to rely on the judgment of
the "informed people." But since there is no evidence on how they would react
to the question, Marshall projects his own "reasonable man," saying that "the
average citizen would, in my opinion, find [capital punishment] shocking to his
conscience and sense of justice. 1 23 "For this reason alone," he concludes, "capital
punishment cannot stand."' 4
Emphasizing the capricious way in which capital punishment has been
administered, Justices Douglas, Stewart and White believe that it should be considered unconstitutional. Douglas argues that
[I]t is "cruel and unusual to apply the death penalty . . . selectively to
minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of socety, and who are
unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not
countenance general application of the same penalty across the boards.' 5

Accordingly, the statutes which give judges or juries the discretion to select
between the death sentence and a life or term imprisonment "are unconstitutional in their operation."'" Similarly, Justice Stewart argues that application of
the penalty has been "wanton and freakish," making its imposition arbitrary "in
the same way of a person being struck by lightning."' 7 Since the latter is irrational
and entirely unpredictable, capital punishment must also be judged to be capricious and against the Constitution.
Justice White stresses the infrequency in which death is administered, attributing the rarity in imposition to the discretion of juries. "Legislative 'policy,"'
he observes, "is ... necessarily defined not by what is legislatively authorized but
by what juries and judges do in exercising the discretion so regularly conferred
upon them."'" In his judgment; this practice violates the Constitution.
B. The Dissenting Opinions in Furman
All the dissenting justices perceive the question primarily in utilitarian terms.
For Chief Justice Burger, with the rest of the "Nixon Quartet" concurring,
10 Id. at 291.
11 Id. at 360.
12 Id. at 361.
13 Id. at 369.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 245.
16 Id. at 256.
17 Id. at 309.
18 Id. at 314.
19 Phillip Kurland seems to have coined the term "Nixon Quartet." Kurland, 1971 Term;
The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 SuP. CT. REV. 181.
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the states' failure to prove'its effectiveness is no basis for prohibiting the death
penalty. 0 Moreover, the claim of arbitrariness lacks empirical support. Rarity
is not necessarily capriciousness. ,The very infrequency of death penalties imposed
by juries attests their cautious and discriminating reservation of that penalty for
the most extreme cases."- In effect, Burger remains unpersuaded by the statistical
evidence relied on by his colleagues on the opposite side of the decision.
It is remarkable that, none of the dissenting justices rest judgment on the
intrinsic value of capital punishment. In their separate 6pinions, Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist all suggest limitations to the Court's role in this
matter. Blackmun believes that "elected representatives of the people" have
already made a clear and informed choice for maintaining the penalty.22 Powell
and Rehnquist stress the need for deferring the matter to the legislature. In
Powell's words, "this type of inquiry lies at the periphery... of the judicial process in constitutional cases. The assessment of popular opinion is essentially the
legislative, not a judicial, function."2 3 And Rehnquist concludes that the majority's ruling significantly lacks humility and deference to legislative judgment.24
It seems that a "wait-and-see" approach characterizes the attitudes of the
dissenting justices. The death penalty may be cruel, but it was accepted as fit
by the society and the court. The punishment may also be ineffective, but that
must be proven by its opponents. Before the society expresses a clear and strong.
consensus against the penalty, and before the critics prove that it does not deter,
the Court should not take the lead toward its elimination. In effect, this argument evades the substantive issue of the value of capital punishment and places
the burden of proof on its opponents. It reflects a judicial presumption that,
in spite of attack on the punishment, public opinion remains unchanged on its
acceptability. Before a suitable solution is found, maintaining the status quo
25
avoids placing the whole issue "in an uncertain limbo."
C. Conclusion: Failure to Face the Moral Issue
Several important points can be made about these views. Both Brennan
and Marshall criticize the death penalty primarily on the gr6und of justice. For
them, capital punishment is degrading and repugnant to the contemporary sense
of fairness. Implicit is the notion that human life should not be taken arbitrarily,
either by individuals or by the state, especially in a random and selective manner.
But the death sentence may also be defended on the ground of justice: The only
appropriate response to a.serious crime is imposition of death. It could be argued
that some crimes are atrocious because they degrade the value of hdiman life,'
and that it may indeed offend a sense of fairness if an innocent victim dies while
his convicted murderer lives. While this arguinexit sounds retribfitive, it would
20 408 U.S. at 404.

21 Id. at 388-89.
22 Id. at 413.
23 Id. at 443.
24 Id. at 468.
25 The burden of proving the deterrent effect, or lack thereof, of capital punishment, is
one of the principal issues in the debate between Hugo Bedau and Ernest van den Haag.
Compare Bedau, Death Penalty as a Deterrent: Argument and Evidence, 80 'ETHICs 205
(1970), with van den Haag, On Deterrence and the Death Penalty, 78 Erimos 280 (1968).
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be hard to deny that retribution is still a psychological response manifested by a
fraction of the public (though its proportion to the total population is unknown)
to heinous crimes. Criminal sentences often reflect the public's moral concern
over the nature of the offense and its standard of human conduct.
It seems illusory to believe that elimination of jury discretion in the sentencing for serious crimes would in turn elimate discriminatory imposition of the
death sentence. The law may make the penalty mandatory, but it is the jury
in most capital cases which reaches a verdict of guilt. Conceivably a jury could
refuse to convict a person and thereby avoid sending him to death. In addition,
discretion is exercised by the police, the prosecutor, the judge and the jury
throughout the criminal process. To remove it from one stage does not suggest
that it will not reappear, and perhaps play a different role, at another stage of
the process.26
If the death penalty's moral acceptability were an explicit issue then the
alignment of justices might have been different. There is no doubt that Brennan
and Marshall would have remained committed to their views and they might
have rallied the support of Justice Powell, who expressed personal pleasure that
the penalty was restricted by Furman. Justice Stewart might have decided differently, as he indicated that "channeling [the] instinct [of retribution] in the
administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
stability of a society governed by law."2 Both White and Douglas are ambiguous
on this score. Despite his criticism of capital punishment as administered in the
states, Justice Douglas evaded the moral issue entirely. And for his emphasis on
unfair administration, it is not inconceivable that Justice White might wish to
maintain the penalty in a limited form.
This possible realignment suggests a remarkable fact: The debate in the
high court over capital punishment is cast almost entirely in utilitarian terms.
Moreover, neither side is likely to convince the other in this debate, both because
of a lack of empirical understanding of the "utility" of the death penalty and
because of the elusive nature of the problem which has made efforts toward proof
largely futile. By the effect of its ruling, however, the moral issue which was
avoided in Furman is now squarely before the Court.
III. Case Law on Capital Punishment
Although the narrow focus of Furman has left unanswered the moral value
of capital punishment, it marked a break with a long line of judicial precedents
in addressing itself directly to the constitutionality of the punishment. Furman's
significance cannot be underrated; it clears the way for the Supreme Court to
deal directly with the substantive issue.
C. BLACK, supra note 6, at 37-55.
408 U.S. at 308. Judge Learned Hand has expressed a somewhat similar attitude:
[Most people have a feeling that "justice" requires a law breaker to suffer, just
as they think that sin should entail suffering in the sinner. Personally I do not share
that feeling, which is a vestige. I believe, of very ancient primitive and irrational
beliefs and emotions. However, it would be unwise, and incidentally impracticable
to disregard it as a constituent element; it is extremely strong in most people.
Letter from Learned Hand to the University of Chicago Law Review. 22 U. Cm. L. Rav.
26
27

319 (1955).
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Judicial decisions prior to Furman all accepted, explicitly or implicitly, that
the death penalty was consistent with the eighth amendment to the Constitution.
In these decisions, the Supreme Court typically perceived the issue to be one
concerning certain types of punishment rather than the mode of punishment.
Capital punishment was held not to be within the type prohibited. Thus, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a Utah statute which authorized
the judge to choose between hanging and shooting as the means for putting a
convicted prisoner to death.' Similarly, in In re Kemmler the Court ruled that
electrocution was consistent with the demands of the eighth amendment." Speaking of the death sentence, the Court stated:
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the Constitution. It implies there something more inhuman and
barbarous; something more than a mere extinguishment of life.30
A further exposition by the Court of the eighth amendment's ban is Weems
v. United States,31 in which a gross disparity existed between a punishment and
an offense. The disparity was measured in terms of a comparison of the penalty
in question to that for more serious offenses. In addition, the Court objected to
an extension of "supervision by authorities" after the prison term expired. In
1958, expatriation was considered by the Court to be against the ban,"3 and in
1962, the Court struck down a California law imposing a penalty for an offense
of "being addicted to the use of narcotics!" These rulings obviously added a
new dimension to the meaning of "cruel and unusual" punishment, by extending
the eighth amendment prohibition to penalties which by their nature were not
barbaric or abhorrent, but rather where their application in specific situations
raised questions of fairness.
With these cases in the background, the Court in 1971 decided McGautha
v. California.31 A California statute allowing the jury to exercise discretion in
imposing the death penalty for first-degree murder in a separate proceeding and
in the absence of specific standards was challenged as a violation of the eighth
amendment. Speaking for the Court, Justice Harlan stated that it was not impermissible for a state to consider "that the compassionate purposes of jury sentencing in capital cases are better served by having the issue of guilt and punishment determined in a single trial than by focusing the jury's attention solely on
punishment after guilt has been determined." 5 Thus, procedural considerations
and deference to the state legislature diverted the Court's attention from the
question on the constitutionality of the death penalty. Yet these two criteria do
not give rise to an adequate constitutional standard by which the question can
be answered.
28

Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).

29

136 U.S. 436 (1890).

30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 447.
217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 '(1958).
Robinson v. Dulles, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
402 U.S. 183 (1970).

35 Id. at 183.
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Clearly, then, when the Court in Furman finally addressed itself to the death
penalty and struck it from discretionary statutes, it laid an historic landmark.
Judicial precedents, however, provide legitimacy for this apparent break. For
years a flexible concept of "cruel and unusual" had manifested itself in the
Court's decisions. It was held in Weems, for example, that the Constitution casts
upon the judiciary the duty of determining whether punishments have been
properly apportioned in a particular statute, and if not, to decline to enforce it."
The same Court observed that the eighth amendment would be "progressive,
and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.13 7

Half a century later, the Court

held in Trop v. Dulles that "[w]hile the state has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards." 8 As the Court implied, determining these standards was
within the domain of the Supreme Court.
In light of these decisions, Furman represented a break with the tradition of
putting capital punishment in a category deemed consistent with the demands
of the eighth amendment. Nonetheless, the Furman approach to the merits of
the penalty on the basis of contemporary humane standards stood in line with an
evolving concept of "cruel and unusual" punishment which had already found
its way in several leading decisions.
IV. Rarity and Capriciousness
The point which apparently has been accepted by all of the justices in the
Furman majority is that the death penalty is rarely administered, and that therefore its execution against a prisoner would be unfair and arbitrary. The first
statement inthis argument raises a factual question which can be proved. The
second point, however, is a question of judgment, which, logically, may not follow
from the first.
The death sentence had almost run its course by 1972. In 1930, 155 persons
were executed and during the next decade the number increased to about 200
annually, as the country passed through the social and economic trauma assodated with the Depression. Subsequently, executions steadily declined with
none occurring since the end of 1967. Of the 3,859 executions from 1930 to
1967, the overwhelming majority, 3,335, were for murder, followed by 435 for
rape. Of all the executions, only 33 were for the violation of federal laws (eight
of these for espionage), while 160 executions were administered in the armed
forces. Throughout the entire decade of the 1960's, only one execution was carried out in the federal jurisdiction." Clearly, capital punishment was in the main
a phenomenon of the state judiciary.
When Furman was decided, capital punishment was part of the law in 39
36 217 U.S. at 378-79.
37 Id. at 378. The eighth amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958).
38 356 U.S. 98, 100 (1958).
39 BUREAU oF PRIsoNs, DEP'T oF JUSICE, NATL PrSONER STAT. BULL. No. 45, CAPrrAL
PUNISHMENT 1930-1968. 28 '(1969).
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states. Except for Ohio, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Alabama, however,
none of these states, and only ten states overall, had mandatory death penalties
for any crime. By 1972, then, the death penalty had dwindled t6 a point of
extinction, and in law the trend had drifted toward its elimination. It is an irony
that Furman not-only revived the debate but, in addition, stimulated almost 40
states to the adoption of mandatory death penalties.
Even though death has rarely been imposed on convicted offenders, does it
follow that, where prisoners were executed, certain kinds of people suffered disproportionately? The Furman majority seems to have accepted this assumption.
Justice Douglas implies that blacks were singled out for execution."0 The, extent
of differentiation on the basis of color could be determined, if evidence showed
that a greater number of blacks were executed relative to the total population
of the blacks convicted of capital offenses, than that of whites to the population
of whites sentenced to death. In this formulation, it becomes an empirical question, for which a few studies are available for consideration. In a comprehensive
study, Marvin Wolfgang examined 439 persons sentenced to death for murder
in Philadelphia between 1914 and 1958.' Although the absolute figure shows
that death was administered against more blacks than whites, this does not indicate discriminatory application of the penalty because, in fact, more blacks were
convicted than whites. Proportionately, 88 percent of blacks on death row were
executed, as compared with 80 percent of whites.4 In a separate study, Wolfgang also found that in Philadelphia, 73 percent of the homicide victims and 75
percent of the offenders were black, even though blacks comprised only 20 percent
of the city's population during the period under investigation. 2 On the basis of
this evidence, one could argue that blacks were more likely to commit homicide,
or, on the other hand, that they were more likely to be convicted of homicide. If
the latter is true, it cannot be corrected by merely insisting that the death penalty
be uniformly applied.
Philadelphia, however, is certainly not representative of Southern citles. In
another study, Anthony Amsterdam and Marvin Wolfgang examined more than
3,000 rape convictions in eleven Southern States between 1945 and 1965.4'
They found that 13 percent of the blacks convicted of rape were executed, while
approximately only 2 percent of the white rape offenders Were put to death.
This obviously indicates disproportionate administration of the sentence. Moreover, Southern juries seemed particularly sensitive to cases involving a rape by a
black man against a white woman. If convicted, a black defendant would be
eighteen times more likely to be executed as all other prisoners sentenced to death,
regardless of racial combinations."
Empirical evidence, then, supports only part of the argument of discrimilnatory execution. While the evidence does suggest that the Southern practice
was discriminatory, it appears invalid to contend that the death penalty has been
40 408 U.S. at 251.

41 Wolfgang, Kelley & Nolde, Comparison of the Eecuted and Committed Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CRrm. L. C. & P. S. 301 (1962).
42 M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS OF CPIMINAL HomcrE 185-89, 202-22 (1958).
43 Wolfgang & Riedel, Race, Judicial Discretion, and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS OF
Am. ACADEMY OF POL. & Soc. SCMNCES 119 (1973).
44 Id.
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administered disproportionately against a particular ethnic minority group in the
states out of the South.
It is important to understand the implications of these facts. It seems a
fair assumption that in the South blacks are more likely than whites to be apprehended by police, charged by prosecutors and convicted by juries for most crimes.
Perhaps blacks also suffer from heavier penalties across the board. If this is true,
should we also abolish all penalties because they have been imposed discriminatorily in the South? It is clear that making the death penalty mandatory will
not end discrimination which is inherent in the criminal justice system as administered in certain states. If the current situation continues, then one could
conceivably find evidence in the future that more blacks than whites were convicted of crimes under statutes with mandatory death sentence. Discrimination
lies in the use of discretion, and discretion is inevitable in the administration of
justice.
One might argue, however, that because the system operates unjustly in the
South, this makes it all the more imperative for the Supreme Court to intervene
by putting an end to the death penalty. Capital punishment may not have been
capriciously applied in the North, but that does not make it morally acceptable.
Furthermore, in areas where the administration of justice is less than fair, the
death sentence is even more unfit as a response to crime. This argument, in effect,
questions the moral appropriateness of capital punishment which, as will be
shown later, should be the focal point of current discussions.
V. Measuring the Effect of the Death Sentence
Whether the death penalty deters potential criminals from committing capital offenses is an elusive question. Despite this problem, however, contemporary
debates almost always have centered on deterrence. Often, easy assumptions are
made and sweeping generalizations are offered on the deterrent effect of capital
punishment.
The debate was joined in Furman between Justice Marshall and Chief
Justice Burger. The former argues that, "in light of the massive amount of evidence before us," the punishment "cannot be justified on the basis of its deterrent
effect.... The statistical evidence is not convincing beyond all doubts, but it
is persuasive."4 5 Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, questions whether the
states should be required to prove deterrent effect in order to retain the penalty,
or whether it should be the burden of its opponents to produce convincing evidence on its lack of deterrence. The burden of proof seemed crucial to Burger,
since he suggests that if the burden were put on the states, one might as well
challenge "all punishments" as "suspect of being 'cruel and unusual' within the
meaning of the Constitution.""
For other justices in the majority, an assumption cuts across their opinions
that the sentence lacks significant deterrent effect. For those on the dissenting
side, however, the issue is as much one concerning the burden of proof, as con45
46

408 U.S. at 354-59.
Id. at 396.
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cerning the weight of evidence. It appears, nonetheless, that the dissenting justices held no strong belief in the deterrent effect of the penalty.
Since deterrence is factual, available empirical studies may provide an answer. Some of the studies to be discussed below have lent support to the justices
on either side. But a close examination indicates that they are of dubious validity.
One of the questions to be asked and tested concerns the correlation between
the rates of murder and the death penalty. Since police often respond with
rigorous campaigns against suspects of murderous assaults on policemen, this type
of confrontation provides a good case for measuring the deterrent effect of capital
punishment. Donald R. Campion examined the rate at which police were shot
and killed in states that had prescribed capital punishment for this type of offense,
and states that did not have such a law. He reached the conclusion that the
7
rates were about the same, that is, there was no positive correlation.1
Another test is on the variation in homicide rates in a given state or city,
before and after the convicts were executed and such executions were publicized.
William Graves has found that in California there was no significant correlation
at all. Interestingly, Graves controlled the variable of publication about executions, and then found that the rates of homicide on the days preceding the executions increased. " Either this was a mere coincidence caused by other uncontrolled
(or uncontrollable) variables, or it indicates that publicity about executions gave
impetus to some persons for killing.
A more comprehensive work is Thorsten Sellin's Capital Punishment.49
Sellin compared homicide rates in four ways. The first may be called the "horizontal comparison," where several adjacent states were studied. The hypothesis
was that if the death penalty had a deterrent effect, then homicide rates in these
states with the penalty should be lower than in those without it. Yet this hypothesis was disconfirmed. Variations in the rates among these states appear to have
taken place in the same way, regardless of the presence or absence of the death
penalty in the law codes.
Sellin's second test may be called the "vertical comparison," where homicide
rates were studied before and after capital punishment was abolished within
the state. In some states where the death penalty had been abolished, the rates
were examined before and after the punishment was restored. Again, there was
no evidence that significant change in rates occurred in accord with the status
of capital punishment.
Turning to the effect of publicity about executions, a problem already taken
up by William Graves and other observers, Sellin confirmed their findings; publicity about executions did not make much difference in homicide activities in a
state or city. Finally, Sellin's work also suggests that the rate of murderous attacks
on police officers in states with the death penalty for that offense was no lower
than in states without it. This result is in line with Campion's finding noted
above.
47

Campion, Does the Death Penalty Protect State Police? in

(H. Bedau ed. 1964).
Graves, A Doctor Looks at Capital Punishment, in THE

THE DEATH PENALTY IN

AMERICA 301

48

322 (H. Bedau ed. 1964).
49 T. SELLIN, CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT

(1967).

DEATH

PENALTY IN AMERICA
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0 One
Sellin's work obviously influenced Justice Marshall in Furman."
serious problem, however, lies in his broad category of "homicide rates." Statistical data compiled by most states and the FBI does not indicate the proportion
of. murders among "homicides." While manslaughter is a homicide it is not
punishable by death. Thus, Sellin's data included homicide activities for which
death was not prescribed by the law. Assuming that the adjacent states chosen
by Sellin were capable of being matched, it is quite possible that the lack of
change, in homicide rates conceals some variations if capital offenses were singled
out from the data.
Another problem is illustrated by the very case of Furman, where the issue
arose out of the death penalty imposed for rape and robbery, but not for homicide. The penalty is prescribed for a number of nonhomicidal crimes (kidnapping, etc.) in various states. The use of homicide rates, then, excluded data that
might be relevant.
One point articulated by several justices in Furman suggests a further
problem with Sellin's findings. Capital punishment has been imposed so infrequently that it may have ceased to be an active factor in the decisions of those
criminals who chose to think rationally. Since 1967, as noted above, no death
sentence has been administered. For an informed person, then, what exists in the
legal codes may not constitute a substantial threat. The odds of being put to
death are so small that he may well choose to ignore them in a criminal decision.
In order to better understand the impifcations of deterrence, it would be
useful to take an analytic look at the decisional process for-a crime. Murder may
be committed by four types of persons with differing mental states. The first is
the insane; a person who either could not control his impulse to kill or did not
know what he was doing. The second type includes persons whose intentional
crimes were not designed to kill, yet death of another person resulted incidentally.
For this type of person, capital punishment would not have entered into the mind
before his act since he had not thought of killing a man in the first place. The
third type is passioned killers, for whom murder was a successful assault. A casual
encounter developed into a rage, which then escalated into violence. The resulting homicide was primarily an extension of the brawl, accomplished with a weapon in most cases. While in law, a person who has knowingly killed another person would be regarded as having committed an intentional crime, the "split
second" decision might be made without going through a rational process. To
be a deterrent, however, the death penalty must become a decisional factor for a
person's action.
It seems clear, then, that capital punishment should be an effective deterrent
against only the fourth type, a "rational," cold-blooded killer. In a well-calculated decisional process, the penalty would play the following role:
[ (1-P) Vg -P(Vp) I - Vn>O
where: Vg is the value of gain by committing the crime;
Vp is the value of punishment;
Vn is the value of not committing the crime and hence staying clear
of the law; and
P is the probability that punishment will be imposed on the offender.
50
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For a rational person, the gain of crime offset by the cost of punishment if
inflicted on him would have to be greater than the gain from remaining a lawabiding citizen. In situations involving capital offenses, where the death penalty is prescribed by law, the value for committing crime should be the most
negative relative to any other form of punishment. If the probability of infliction
(P) is a certainty, then it is most likely that the offender'would be deterred by
the penalty. His choice would be between committing the crime with resultant
execution, and refraining from the crime. The choice, unfortunately, is not
always so clear. Although the law prescribes the death sentence, often it is not
the only punishment. Even when it is the only punishment, the probability of
its imposition is far from certain. One may never be caught by police; if arrested
and prosecuted, one may plead to a less serious offense; one may be acquitted
on trial. If convicted the judge or jury may impose life imprisonment rather
than the death sentence; and even if the court should sentence the offender to
death, the punishment may not be administered. In short, the whole criminal
process intervenes between the variable of the death penalty and that of committing a capital crime, making the intended deterrence of the punishment a rather
unimportant factor in a decisional process.
Furman v. Georgiaand the legislative reinstatement of the penalty in various
states, of course, have removed discretion from the judge or jury. But from a
rational point of view, the very "humane" reluctance, noted by Chief Justice
Burger, to execute a convict, the inefficiency in law enforcement and availability
of "diversions" in the system such as plea bargaining, have all seemed to diminish
the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
VI. Deterrence-Some Further Thoughts
Criminal law textbooks often assume that deterrence is a major function of
the law. 5' This assumption is not unreasonable; common sense dictates that
one would not commit a crime in front of a policeman. Yet the necessary presence of a policeman underlies the vital role of effective law enforcement. Efficacy
is essential for the law to serve its deterrent function. In April 1965, for example,
New York City deployed a large number of police patrols in the subways, assigning one policeman to every subway train and at every station between 8: 00 p.m.
and 4:00 a.m. This policy continued to be implemented for more than eight
years. In an analysis of its effect on subway robberies, it was found that although
the rate of robbery continued to rise (in 1970 the rate increased by six times over
that in 1965), it fell during the hours when the extra policeman was present.52
Where law enforcement is effective, the law could be a deterrent against
crime. In the studies which have attempted to measure the deterrent effect of
capital punishment, however, factors involved in the criminal process often are
either ignored or not taken into account because of the impossibility of measurement. Most of the problems with the findings, as suggested above, arise from
51 E.g., . KAPLAN, CRrMINAL JUsTICE (1973). For a nontextbook example, see A. GoLDSTErN, THE INsANITY DEFENSE 11-15 (1967).
52 .J. CnAKBN, M. LAWLESS & K. STEVENSON, THE IMPACT OF POLICE AcTrvrry ON
CRImE: ROBBERIES IN THE NEW YoRx CrTy SUBWAY SYsTEm '(1974).
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the remote distance between the two controlled variables--the penalty in the
statutes, and rates of certain crimes. "Deterrence" is so elusive largely because
it is impossible to know exactly how many people have chosen not to violate the
law for fear of punishment. It is possible, however, to test the responses of selected
groups of people. Surveys conducted on persons who have already been arrested
for offenses are unreliable, since the sample is biased as it excludes those who
may have been deterred. For example, answers given by prisoners tend to indicate that they were not afraid of the electric chair.5"
Difficulty in measuring deterrent effect does not mean that deterrence does
not work. It may be a key notion to measure effectiveness in police strategy. A
few years ago, on the assumption that uniformed police may deter criminals from
committing crime in their presence, the New York City Police Department assigned one thousand officers dressed in plain clothes to streets in high crime areas.
By 1973, they had made over 18 percent of the city's total felony arrests, even
though these officers represented only 5 percent of the city's police forces.5
Clearly, uniformed police do deter, but the deterrence takes effect only in their
presence or vicinity.
Evidence like this suggests that although deterrence may work, it operates
only in limited situations. The study on subway robberies, noted above, indicates
that criminal behavior often reflects reasoned choice by individuals. Presence of
the police often works merely to divert criminal activities, rather than eliminate
them. If calculation of benefits and costs is behind the commission of some
capital offenses (deterrence assumes this calculation), then the likelihood of
arrest, the probability of a plea bargaining, the possibility of acquittal because of
questionable police conduct or evidence, the odds against execution if one is convicted, are all key factors to be weighed by the person facing the choice. In light
of all this, death as a punishment may become a relatively slight factor.
If, on the other hand, calculation is not the way of criminal decisionmaking, either because the person is incapable of thinking rationally or because
he never intends to commit a capital offense, then deterrence by the death penalty
is irrelevant. The society should face the fact that some persons are undeterrable.
One is confronted with the question, which the Supreme Court escaped in Furman, what should we do about these persons? Would capital punishment be
appropriate and fitting for those criminals who have made wrong calculations
about the law, who don't believe that the death penalty will be imposed on them,
or who simply are not clear about the course of their own behavior?
VII. Do We Want Capital Punishment?
It seems clear that, in discussing the status of the death penalty, a debate
on its utility in terms of deterrence will not get us very far. Data will probably
continue to be cited by either side to support an argument, but no solution will
automatically emerge from this utilitarian debate. Since too much is unknown
53 F. SIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 30-32 (1973).
54 Data reported in Wilson, Do the Police Prevent Crime?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1974
(Magazine), at 18.
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(or perhaps unknowable), the Court may have to base its judgment on moral
principles rather than on "scientific evidence." After Furman,it would be difficult
for the Court to avoid a decision on the issue of justice. Furman seems to have
settled the question whether the Court should intervene in such a case, or defer
it to the state legislatures. Despite the criticism by Justices Powell and Rehnquist
that the Court in Furman acted against the "democratic process," the majority
chose to strike down all the statutes which gave discretion to judges or juries in
imposing the death sentence. In theory at least, capricious administration has
been negated by Furman. It is now appropriate to make a decision on the intrinsic value and moral acceptability of the penalty.
If the "democratic process" is at issue then it may be useful to look at two
factors. The first is the will expressed by the state legislatures. While the fact
that 29 states have reinstated the death penalty for specific crimes is relevant,
it does not necessarily suggest that the "representatives of the people" believe
that the penalty is useful as a deterrent. It may well be the articulation of a moral
concern over the commission of certain atrocious crimes or that a large number
of elected officials believe that, for crimes that are especially heinous, "an eye for
an eye" still would be an appropriate societal response.
Public opinion on the issue is ambivalent. Prior to 1966 only 42 percent
favored the death penalty and support for it then declined markedly. In 1969,
however, endorsement of the penalty had increased, reaching 51 percent.55 Little
can be derived from the polls, therefore, except that the society is evenly divided
on the issue.
The Court will also be divided. On the basis of the opinions expressed in
Furman, one would expect a division between Brennan and Marshall on the
one hand, and Burger, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist if deterrence (or the
burden for its proving or disproving) should be the issue. The attitudes of Justices Stewart, White and Stevens are unclear. Any one of them could tilt the
balance toward the status quo. If, however, moral acceptability is the issue, which
it should be, one might anticipate a division between Burger, Brennan and Marshall on one side, and Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist on the
other side. Despite public speculation, Justice Stevens might not cast the decisive
"swing" vote.

VIII. Conclusions
Among several problems posed by the death penalty, the Supreme Court in
Furman chose to attack the one concerning its discriminatory administration. As
a result, not only was the core issue of the penalty's constitutionality left unresolved but, in addition, the Furman ruling seems unconvincing in its rationale.
For one thing, the death sentence had virtually disappeared from practice, and
thus its "capricious" administration, if any, could be regarded as part of recent
history. What Justice Stewart considered as the striking by lightning appeared
to have not struck for nearly a decade. For another, rarity may not reflect capriciousness. Instead, it seemed to indicate the "humaneness" of the judge or jury
55 Ersklne, The Polls: Capital Punishment, 34 PuBLi OPINIoN

QUARTERLY

290 '(1970).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 1976]

who had discretion on whether to impose a death sentence. Moreover, no strong
evidence. can be derived from available empirical studies to show that minority
groups have been sentenced to death selectively or disproportionately. While it
seems true that in the South Negroes were more likely to be sentenced to death
than whites, the phenomenon reflects as much capricious imposition of capital
punishment as discrimination against Negroes at other stages of the criminal
process. Removing the death penalty from the process of discretionary sentencing
does not solve the broader problem of discrimination.
While the Furman ruling attacks discriminatory practice, its debate revolves
around the deterrent effect or utilitarian value of the death penalty. Capital
punishment either deters or it does not: an issue that is clearly an empirical question. However, although empirical questions often can be answered on the basis
of facts and data, this one is particularly difficult. No one knows how many persons chose not to commit a crime because of capital punishment. Some studies
tend to focus on the motivations of those who have violated the law; but many of
these people certainly have not been deterred. Other studies compare the rates
of crime in various situations, concluding that the death penalty has made no
difference in crime rates. Aside from the many theoretical problems which tend
to undermine the validity of these studies, a distinctive weakness lies in their inability to bridge the remote distance between capital punishment in the law
codes and a criminal decision made by an individual. Diversions in the criminal
process which intervene between criminal behavior and the imposition of death
are so numerous that measurement of correlations between the death sentence
and its impact on criminal conduct seems unrealistic. As is shown in this commentary, for those persons on whom capital punishment should have a deterrent
effect (not to mention those who are basically undeterrable), the penalty may
play a slight role in their decisional process.
Furmansuggests the futility of the utilitarian debate. The problem of deterrence has many uncontrollable variables. Despite the claim that evidence was
"persuasive, '"56 it is time to admit that our knowledge about the deterrent effect
of the death penalty lacks sufficient certainty. The debate may continue, but it
will not carry us very far.
The constitutionality of capital punishment, then, should be resolved on
moral value of the penalty. Does it fit our society? Do we consider it an appropriate response to serious crimes? Public opinion polls indicate that the society
seems evenly divided. Thus, reference to the "democratic process" does not contribute to a decisive solution. Legislators, in any case, are ill-equipped to announce and elaborate on first moral principles. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
not only seems most fit to solve the problem on moral grounds in the context of
the Constitution, but will find it difficult again to evade the issue of the intrinsic
value of capital punishment. As on so many previous occasions where the Couft
had to deal with a problem without clear solutions, it should face the moral
acceptability of capital punishment in its forthcoming decision, and provide' a
nonevasive, unambiguous answer to the question.
56
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